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BPP Holdings Ltd and others v HMRC: Securing Administrative Justice in Tax Tribunals 
 
Introduction  
 
 BPP Holdings Ltd and others v HMRC (BPP Holdings Ltd) 1  marks a useful contribution by 
the Supreme Court (SC) on tribunal procedure. The underlying dispute related to VAT, 
but the substantive issues were not relevant here. The key question for the SC in this case 
was whether an order issued by the tax chamber of the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) 
debarring HMRC from defending an appeal was an order the FTT was entitled to make. 
This central question provided the SC with the opportunity to generate further guidance 
on a number of related matters and to provide clarity as to whether HMRC can benefit 
from preferential treatment in comparison to other parties in tax proceedings before the 
FTT. The issues the case-note discusses are the following: 
 
(i) the SC’s guidance on how tribunals should go about importing procedural 
standards from the civil courts system, namely that any standards should be 
imported with nuance, taking into account the differences between a tax 
tribunal and the ordinary court system;   
(ii) its unequivocal refusal to endorse an approach that would allow for the 
preferential treatment of HMRC or other public bodies and state agencies 
appearing before tribunals; 
(iii) its critique of the existing sanctions system for litigants who do not comply 
with time limits and cause delays that may prejudice the other parties to the 
dispute: 
(iv) the appropriate standard of review to be applied when attempting to 
determine whether the impugned decision was one that the decision-maker 
was entitled to make.2  
 
Facts  
 
Following a corporate rearrangement, BPP Holdings Ltd (BPP), a company providing 
education and books to students, was divided into a separate companies. One of the new 
companies (UC) took over the duties of providing education, while another (LM) was 
responsible for the supply of books. Of these two new entities, it was accepted that UC 
made standard-rated supplies for VAT purposes, but BPP took the view that the LM’s 
supplies were zero-rated and did not account for VAT on its supplies. In response, HMRC 
issued VAT assessments on LM, arguing that BPP’s approach was flawed, or alternatively, 
that the rearrangement constituted an abuse. BPP appealed this assessment to the FTT. 
HMRC served its statement of case with a 14-day delay, while additionally failing to 
clearly set out the facts on which it would rely to support its contention that VAT was 
owed. In light of this, BPP requested further information and an order was made by the 
FTT directing HMRC to reply within a specific timeframe. The order was accompanied by 
a stern warning, informing HMRC that failure to comply may result in an order barring it 
from taking further part in the proceedings. While HMRC responded within the set time 
                                                          
*Teaching Fellow in Public Law and Human Rights, University of Edinburgh 
1 BPP Holdings Ltd and others v HMRC [2017] UKSC 55. 
2 The standard was set out by Lord Greene in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v Wednesbury 
Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, requires the reviewing judge to assess whether the decision-maker’s 
determination was “so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it”. 
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limit, the BPP applied for a debarring order against HMRC, on the basis that the responses 
provided did not in fact sufficiently address each of the questions posed in BPP’s request 
for information. Judge Mosedale in the FTT accepted that the responses provided by 
HMRC were wholly inadequate and the debarring order was granted.3 This decision was 
subsequently appealed by HMRC to the Upper Tribunal which allowed the appeal.4 The 
Court of Appeal then restored the debarring order5 and the case was finally appealed by 
HMRC to the SC. The single judgement was given by Lord Neuberger, with whom the 
remaining justices agreed.  
 
1. The contribution of Civil Procedure to the procedure before Tribunals 
 
An initial issue raised in the judgment under examination relates to the appropriate 
approach tax tribunals must take when determining the applicable sanction for a party 
that fails to comply with procedural directions. 
 
In reaching her conclusion to bar HMRC from future proceedings, Judge Mosedale in the 
FTT6 had relied on guidance provided in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd 
(Mitchell).7  Non-compliance with such orders was traditionally excused in instances 
where the prejudice caused to the other parties by the non-compliance could be 
remedied, for instance, through payment of costs. However, following reforms to the 
Court Procedure Rules (CPRs),8  the Court of Appeal in Mitchell held that a stricter 
approach should be taken against a party that failed to comply with procedural rules, 
even if the sanction was “harsh”.9 It was not sympathetic to claims by the appellant’s 
solicitors that their failure to lodge a costs budget in the appropriate timeframe was 
attributable to work-related pressures and should be excused.10 CPRs, however, do not 
                                                          
3 BPP Holdings Ltd and others v HMRC (BPP Holdings Ltd (FTT)) [2014] UKFTT 644(TC). 
4 HMRC v BPP Holdings Ltd and others [2015] UKUT 496 TCC; [2015] STC 415. 
5 BPP Holdings Ltd and others v HMRC (BPP Holdings Ltd (CA)) [2016] EWCA Civ 121. Rather oddly, 
although Lord Neuberger appears to distance the SC  from the CA’s judgment by saying that although it 
agreed with its conclusion, it “should not be taken as approving all its reasoning”(BPP Holdings Ltd, above 
fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [9]) there is no point at which the CA’s reasoning is specifically criticised by the 
SC. 
6 BPP Holdings Ltd (FTT), above fn. 3, [2014] UKFTT 644(TC). 
7 Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1537; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 795. In Mitchell, the Court 
of Appeal was assessing how strictly it should “enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and 
orders in the light of the changes made to CPR r 3.9”. See C. Brockman, ‘The Jackson Reforms and the 
Mitchell Decision’ available at http://www.guildhallchambers.co.uk/uploadedFiles/RelieffromSanction-
CB.pdf [Accessed 19 October 2017].  
8  These changes to the CPRs were brought under the ‘Jackson Reforms’ that recommended tougher 
sanctions for non-compliance. See Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (TSO, 
2010). See also, Jack R. Williams, "Well, that's a relief (from sanctions)!" - Time to pause and take stock of 
CPR r.3.9 developments within a general theory of case management’ (2014) 33 Civil Justice Quarterly 
394-411; Andrew Higgins, ‘CPR 3.9: the Mitchell guidance, the Denton revision, and why coded messages 
don't make for good case management’ (2014) 33 Civil Justice Quarterly 379-393; Lord Justice Richards, 
‘The Mitchell/Denton line of cases: securing compliance with rules and court orders’ (2015) 34 Civil 
Justice Quarterly 249-253.  
9 Mitchell, above fn. 7, [2013] EWCA Civ 1537 at [59]. 
10 Mitchell, above fn. 7, [2013] EWCA Civ 1537 at [81].The Court of Appeal was particularly dismissive to 
this claim as it stressed that “Solicitors cannot take on too much work and expect to be able to persuade a 
court that this is a good reason for their failure to meet deadlines. They should either delegate the work to 
others in their firm or, if they are unable to do this, they should not take on the work at all. This may seem 
harsh especially at a time when some solicitors are facing serious financial pressures. But the need to 
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apply to tribunals which have their own procedural regulations.11 While there are some 
significant similarities between the respective rules of procedure, there were also “clear 
differences in the words”12 used. Therefore, the question for the SC in BPP Holdings Ltd 
was whether Judge Mosedale was correct in taking Mitchell into account. More 
specifically, was there any persuasive value that could be assigned to case-law relating to 
rules of procedure in civil litigation when assessing the appropriate sanction for 
breaching tribunal orders in the context of a tax dispute?  
 
In his analysis, Lord Neuberger endorses the view that when examining issues of 
procedure, tribunals may rely on standards developed by the courts.13 Tribunals “should 
generally follow a similar approach”14 to the ordinary court system where sanctions are 
concerned. This reliance, however, must be exercised with caution and is not all-
encompassing. Thus, in BPP Holdings Ltd, Lord Neuberger highlights two important 
matters that tribunals should take into account when seeking guidance on procedure 
from the ordinary court system.  
 
Firstly, Lord Neuberger notes that the jurisdiction of some tribunals extends to the whole 
of the UK and therefore, they should strive to apply any rules in a uniform manner across 
the UK.15 Consequently, tribunal judges, when seeking guidance from civil procedure 
standards, should be wary of focusing solely on the procedural jurisprudence developed 
in the English and Welsh courts. Approaches in Northern Ireland and Scotland should also 
be taken into account.16  
 
Secondly, Lord Neuberger identifies the limitations of relying on case-law relating to 
sanctions for failure to comply with time-limits under the CPRs. While weight must be 
given to the courts’ approach, the differences between civil courts and tax tribunals must 
also be given due consideration before any standards are imported to the tribunal system. 
Ultimately, the courts’ approach to CPRs and sanctions should not be imported directly to 
tax tribunals. Lord Neuberger agreed with the Court of Appeal’s finding in that the 
approach followed by Judge Mosedale in the FTT was indeed characterised by nuance, 
and due regard was given to the differences between tax tribunals and the ordinary court 
system. Therefore, her reliance on Mitchell was appropriate and did not constitute a 
reason to allow HMRC’s appeal. 
 
This approach of the SC seeks to clarify the relationship between tribunal and court 
procedure. The SC recognises that inevitably, tribunal judges will draw inspiration from 
civil court procedure. This, for Lord Neuberger, is a wholly appropriate means to develop 
tribunal procedures, but decisions of the courts should be treated only as giving guidance 
by analogy. Tribunals must therefore remain aware of their distinct status in the broader 
justice system. It is questionable whether the SC’s approach here provides sufficient 
                                                          
comply with rules, practice directions and court orders is essential if litigation is to be conducted in an 
efficient manner”.  
11 Tribunals Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (SI 2008/2698). Particularly relevant to the case was 
Rule 8. 
12Per Justice Moore-Bick in the Court of Appeal: BPP Holdings Ltd (CA) above fn. 5, [2016] EWCA Civ 121 at 
[17]. 
13 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [23]. 
14 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [26]. 
15 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [23]. 
16 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [23]. 
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guidance to Tribunal judges in this regard. The SC seems reluctant to provide a more 
thorough account of what a ‘nuanced’ approach would consist and it does not identify the 
procedural rules which should not be directly imported to the tribunal system. It appears 
that the SC is happy to allow the tribunal system itself to carry out this exercise, as long 
as the approach followed stays within the parameters the SC sets with this judgment, 
namely that the standards should not be imported directly, and due regard should be 
given to the whole of the UK. 
 
2. Can state agencies benefit from special treatment before tribunals? 
 
A key characteristic of tribunals is that they adopt a more informal and flexible approach 
to the delivery of justice than courts.17 This led HMRC to argue that debarring them was 
a particularly draconian measure which contravened the public interest. First it was 
argued that the public interest dictated payment of tax. As it was very likely that were the 
debarring order allowed to stand, the VAT would not be recovered, the order 
unnecessarily prevented HMRC from discharging its public duty18 and was a sanction that 
was particularly disproportionate. HMRC’s second argument was that as this was an 
important test case for HMRC,19 debarring it was a sanction that would have 
repercussions far beyond this specific case, as it could result in a decision on the VAT 
status of a supply that would be “erroneous and accordingly contrary to the public 
interest” which would have an impact on other disputes awaiting this decision.20 
 
Lord Neuberger’s response was that  these arguments relating to the public interest could 
not be accepted as adequate or satisfactory. As he stressed, rather than providing further 
leeway to HMRC on the basis that it is a state agency carrying out an important public 
function, courts and tribunals should instead “expect higher standards from public bodies 
than from private bodies or individuals”21 when assessing whether a party in a dispute 
should be sanctioned for a failure to follow tribunal orders. While Lord Neuberger seems 
to acknowledge a legitimate public interest in the collection of VAT, there was an at least 
equal, if not more compelling interest in securing the fairness of proceedings between the 
two parties. This meant that allowing for preferential treatment of HMRC in tax 
proceedings would be an unacceptable outcome. In fact, he went further, and noted that 
there were no sufficiently convincing reasons put forward by HMRC to justify why a 
different approach should be adopted between the ordinary court system and tribunals 
where litigation process is concerned.22 Therefore, the informality associated with 
Tribunals does not, per the SC, allow for departures from procedural rules that would 
seriously disadvantage the other parties.  
The importance of this case as a test case was also rejected as a relevant factor worthy of 
consideration. The SC recounted the FTT’s approach on the matter.23 Judge Mosedale in 
the FTT had argued here that any legal authority that would potentially be attached to 
the final decision for BPP would be undermined by the fact that the case would be heard 
                                                          
17 “[T]ribunals are quicker, cheaper, more informal and more expert than the Courts” See M. Elliott and R. 
Thomas, Public Law 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 687. 
18 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [30]. 
19 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [19]. 
20 This argument was presented by the HMRC in the CA: BPP Holdings Ltd (CA), above fn. 5, [2016] EWCA 
Civ 121 at [28] point f. 
21 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [30]. 
22 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [30]. 
23 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [19]. 
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unopposed.24 Additionally, the SC noted, that the fact that the appeal would be heard 
unopposed thereby increasing, the chances of BPP’s success in the proceedings, was not 
a matter worthy of weighty consideration, “save in exceptional circumstances”.25 
Thus, the key consideration for the tribunal judge to take into account was the interest in 
protecting the inviolability of tribunal orders, especially in light of the fact that no 
explanation was provided to justify HMRC’s dilatoriness. If tribunal orders could easily 
be ignored with impunity by the parties, especially state authorities, individuals 
challenging state agency decisions before a tribunal would be left without any meaningful 
remedy for any prejudice they suffered. This would in turn compromise the effectiveness 
of tribunals as mechanisms to challenge and complain against public authorities. 
 
For these reasons, this is a particularly welcome aspect of the SC’s judgment. Placing 
HMRC in a position of dominance could easily have led to, or even encouraged, abusive 
practices and obstructionism. This would have consequently placed any party appealing 
a determination of HMRC in a position of significant disadvantage in the course of the 
proceedings before the tax chamber. The SC, while not mentioning this point explicitly, 
demonstrates sensitivity in upholding key values associated with good administration 
and administrative justice more broadly. If a tribunal was consistently lenient in favour 
of a state agency, on basis that the agency should fulfil its public duty without obstruction, 
the legitimacy of the tribunal appeals system would be undermined.26 The strict 
application of the rules to HMRC should be useful in future cases, especially where an 
appellant with limited means is faced with undue delay by HMRC. As Lord Neuberger 
correctly asserts, “a dangerous precedent”27 would have been set if an alternative 
approach had been adopted by the FTT. 
 
3. The severity of the sanction the FTT imposed on HMRC 
 
In light of the public interest in favour of allowing HMRC to participate in the appeal that 
was discussed in the previous section, the SC also took the opportunity to comment on 
the existing sanctions regime available to tribunal judges. It had been agreed by both 
parties that the measure taken against HMRC was particularly draconian.28 
 
Lord Neuberger also acknowledged that a debarring order was a particularly strict 
sanction given the circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, this was the only available 
sanction to the tribunal judge. This placed her in the unenviable position of either having 
to provide no remedy to BPP, which meant that HMRC “would have got away with it”,29 
or to make the debarring order which would potentially, as demonstrated above,  have 
ramifications beyond the facts of the specific case. In light of this, Lord Neuberger argued 
that additional sanctioning powers ought to be granted to tribunals,30 replacing the 
                                                          
24 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [19]. 
25 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [32]. 
26 Furthermore, this would cast doubt over the judicial independence and impartiality of to the tribunal 
system. Securing structural independence of the Tribunal system was a key impetus behind the merger of 
the HM Courts and Tribunals Service. See Elliot and Thomas, above fn.18, 633. 
27 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [30]. 
28 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [35]. 
29 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [35]. 
30 “There may be force in the notion that the tribunal rules should provide for the possibility of more 
nuanced sanctions, such as a fine or even the imposition of some procedural advantage”: BPP Holdings Ltd, 
above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [35]. 
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existing binary options, or either no sanction or debarring HMRC, both of which were 
deemed to be “unpalatable.31 This plea to create a more nuanced sanctions regime was 
immediately mitigated, however. Lord Neuberger recognised the complications 
associated with formulating an effective and proportionate system of sanctions and thus 
clarified that the point was mentioned with “diffidence”.32 Nevertheless, BPP Holdings Ltd 
serves to illustrate the dilemma facing tribunal judges who want to uphold the fairness 
of the overall proceedings whilst also serving the public interest. It is hoped that Lord 
Neuberger’s obiter statements on the matter can become the impetus for a broader 
reconsideration of the available relevant sanctions that a tribunal judge can impose to a 
party causing undue delay to proceedings. 
 
4. Was the debarring order a determination the FTT was entitled to make? 
The limits of judicial review of Tribunal decisions. 
 
The SC, in determining whether a debarring order was a sanction the FTT was entitled to 
impose, sought to examine the relevance of the considerations taken into account by the 
FTT judge and, conversely, whether any relevant considerations were ignored. The FTT, 
in reaching its conclusion had carefully assessed the prejudice to BPP caused by the delay, 
namely the fact that BPP would not have adequate time to properly prepare their case or 
to address the points raised by HMRC. This was compounded by “the absence of any 
explanation or excuse for the failure, coupled with the existence of other failures by 
HMRC to comply with directions”.33  
 
The SC, once again, endorsed the FTT’s approach in this regard. HMRC, by disputing the 
relevance of the reasons taken into account and by arguing that relevant considerations 
were not taken into account (the public interest in collecting VAT, the public duty of 
HMRC to collect it), asserted that no reasonable authority applying its powers would have 
granted the order. In rejecting this claim, the SC reiterated the limits of its supervisory 
powers. The SC (and the appellate judge more broadly), does not engage in a thorough 
examination of the merits of the determination under review, nor does it substitute its 
own opinion for that of the original decision-maker. The power has been conferred to the 
FTT to make this determination, and whether the SC, or another judge examining the case, 
would have reached the same conclusion given the available facts, is irrelevant. A mere 
disagreement as to the outcome of the case does not suffice for the SC set it aside on the 
grounds that it was unreasonable. A determination, per Lord Neuberger, must be 
“unjustifiable”34 for the SC to quash it. The impugned debarring order could not “cross 
that high hurdle”35 given the circumstances of this case and therefore, was allowed to 
stand. 
While the debarring order was, in Lord Neuberger’s view, not “beyond the limit of 
permissible harshness”36 it was “not far from that limit”.37 The borderline nature of this 
case, however, is attributed more to the lack of a nuanced sanction system than to the 
                                                          
31 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [35]. 
32 “Experience suggests that such ideas, while attractive in theory, can often be difficult to formulate or to 
apply satisfactorily in practice, so I mention the point with some diffidence”. BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, 
[2017] UKSC 55 at [35]. 
33 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [54]. 
34 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [33]. 
35 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [33]. 
36 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [34]. 
37 BPP Holdings Ltd, above fn.1, [2017] UKSC 55 at [34]. 
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unreasonableness of Judge Mosedale’s order. The threshold of unreasonableness thus 
remains one that is particularly difficult to reach, a hurdle that will be overcome in 
particularly limited and extreme circumstances. The SC thus demonstrates no willingness 
to lower this threshold in this case. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
BPP Holdings Ltd provided an opportunity to the SC to clarify a host of significant issues 
relating to the appropriate procedure in the tribunal system. Lord Neuberger’s judgment 
is noteworthy, firstly, for affirming the importance of fairness in tribunal proceedings, 
especially where one party to the dispute is a public authority. The purported public 
interest in the collection of VAT payments and the interest in allowing HMRC to carry out 
its public duty cannot override, in the SC’s estimation, the need to ensure that public 
bodies live up to the expected standards in the conduct of litigation. The SC also 
encourages tribunals to rely on the court system to draw analogies that may be useful for 
the implementation of the tribunal’s own rules of procedure on the condition that any 
influence from the ordinary court system is nuanced BPP also serves to illustrate the 
shortcomings of the current sanctions system available to Tribunal judges. It remains to 
be seen whether Lord Neuberger’s concerns will become a source of motivation for 
changes to the current regime. Finally, the judgment confirms that a decision-maker’s 
determination will not be set aside as unreasonable, unless the outcome is manifestly 
without justification. Ultimately, Lord Neuberger asserts that even in this case, where an 
arguably severe sanction was imposed, the determination was not “on the wrong side of 
the line”38 of reasonableness. 
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